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Abstract 
 
What precisely were the causes and consequences of the trade wars in the 1930s? Were 
there perhaps deeper forces at work in reorienting global trade prior to the outbreak of 
World War II? And what lessons may this particular historical episode provide for the 
present day? To answer these questions, we distinguish between long-run secular trends 
in the period from 1920 to 1939 related to the formation of trade blocs (in particular, the 
British Commonwealth) and short-run disruptions associated with the trade wars of the 
1930s (in particular, large and widespread declines in bilateral trade, the narrowing of 
trade imbalances, and sharp drops in average traded distances). We argue that the trade 
wars mainly served to intensify pre-existing efforts towards the formation of trade blocs 
which dated from at least 1920. More speculatively, we argue that the trade wars of the 
present day may serve a similar purpose as those in the 1930s, that is, the intensification 
of China- and US-centric trade blocs. 
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“Put brutally, it is that barring a political miracle—the whole world is in for the worst 
dose of economic nationalism that it has ever seen. Worst because it will be deliberate; 
because the tools are at hand to make it more absolute than ever before; and because the 
conditions are present that will probably make the resulting dislocation of existing 
national economics more painful than ever before.”  —  W. Y. Elliott, Atlantic Monthly, 
October 1933, p. 424. 
 
1. Introduction 
 With the recent souring of relations between China and the United States, the 
notion of trade wars is no longer consigned to academic treatments of the disastrous 
interwar period. Indeed, trade wars have re-emerged as a topic of considerable interest 
to policymakers. Naturally, outside observers—whether they are academics, the general 
public, or the investment community—have been quick to draw parallels between recent 
changes in commercial policy and the experience of the world economy during and after 
the Great Depression. But what precisely were the causes and consequences of the trade 
wars in the 1930s? Were there perhaps deeper forces at work in reorienting global trade 
prior to the outbreak of World War II? And what lessons may this particular historical 
episode provide for the present day? This paper takes its purpose in providing some 
answers to these questions, but also in emphasizing the limits of historical parallels 
across two time periods with some common features but emerging from very different 
environments.  
In section 2, we provide a narrative account of world trade during the interwar 
period. To begin, we discuss the backdrop of pre-World War I economic integration, 
emphasizing its roots in the early 19th century. We then chart the significant wartime 
disruption, which can be characterized as the first great trade collapse. Following a swift 
and somewhat surprising post-war recovery, the early 1930s gave rise to a second great 
trade collapse in the wake of the Great Depression and the outbreak of protectionism. 
Here, we stress key developments in commercial policy such as the Smoot-Hawley tariff 
act, Britain’s exit from both free trade and the gold standard in 1931, and the Imperial 
Economic Conference of 1932. We also emphasize that the trade wars of the early 1930s 
were executed primarily against all trade partners and in a distinctly uncoordinated 
fashion with instances of bilateral retaliation being minor and rare in comparison. 
Instead, the overwhelming aim of both tariff and non-tariff barriers was as a defense to 
the deflationary forces embedded in the global economy at the time.  
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 In section 3, we provide a quantitative analysis of bilateral trade flows during the 
interwar period. Based on a comprehensive annual panel data set drawn from Jacks and 
Novy (2018), we analyze the performance of two trade blocs (the Commonwealth and 
the so-called Reichsmark bloc) and two currency blocs (the gold bloc and the sterling 
area) first discussed by Eichengreen and Irwin (1995). As organizing principles, we 
distinguish between long-run secular trends in the period from 1920 to 1939 related to 
the formation of trade blocs (in particular, the British Commonwealth) and short-run 
disruptions associated with the trade wars of the early 1930s (in particular, large and 
widespread declines in bilateral trade, the narrowing of trade imbalances, and sharp 
drops in average traded distances). We make use of a state-of-the-art gravity model of 
international trade as our main analytical tool.  
A key finding is that trade between Commonwealth countries already began to 
intensify shortly after World War I and that this trend continued through 1939. This 
appears to have happened at the expense of trade between members of the (larger) 
sterling area which experienced a modest—albeit steady—decline over the same period. 
We interpret this result as the reorientation of Commonwealth trade towards a more 
geopolitically-driven goal, in particular the alleviation of many wartime bottlenecks and 
disruptions to critical resources and war materiel. An important aspect of this 
reorientation was a concomitant increase in the average distance of bilateral trade flows, 
reflecting the fact that the key bilateral relationships within the Commonwealth 
primarily had Britain as their hub and thereby spanned the entire globe. Thus, we can 
characterize this reorientation as a distinct departure from the prevailing 
regionalization of much of international trade in the 1920s and 1930s. As a result, 
distance mattered less over time as a determinant of bilateral trade flows within the 
Commonwealth (i.e., the distance elasticity fell in absolute magnitude). We show that 
this trend was exclusive to Commonwealth trade and not evident in bilateral trade flows 
associated with other blocs. Furthermore, we provide variance decompositions formally 
showing the decreasing influence of distance in explaining bilateral trade flows and the 
increasing influence of the Commonwealth bloc in particular. 
 We close our paper in section 4 by drawing out some lessons as well as the limits 
of historical parallels in helping us to understand trade wars in the present day. First, 
there are some shared common features across the two periods. In particular, there is 
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the prospect that a formerly dominant multilateral trading system is in danger of being 
replaced by a set of bilateral “deals”. At the moment, we have not witnessed a collapse of 
the modern trading system. This is partially for the fact that policymakers seem to have 
learned some of the lessons of interwar history by not responding in a general fashion to 
unilateral moves toward protectionism. This does, however, raise the prospect that the 
trade wars of the present day may serve the same purpose as those in the 1930s, that is, 
the intensification of existing and nascent trade blocs. Thus, it is easy to imagine a 
future in which consumers’ preferences, firms’ perceptions of uncertainty, and states’ 
apprehensions of one another endogenously lead to a reorientation of world trade 
around China- and US-centric trade blocs. However, the extent to which global value 
chains can be unraveled arguably places limits on how far this prospective bloc-based 
trajectory for world trade could proceed. 
 
2. Historical background 
2.1 Pre-war integration and the first great trade collapse 
In the period from the end of the last global conflict in 1815 to the eve of World 
War I in 1913, world exports increased roughly by a factor of 50 in real terms while the 
world exports-to-GDP ratio increased from roughly 1.0% to 11.1% (Jacks, 2018). The 
sources of this trade boom are fairly easy to locate in the form of burgeoning incomes 
and declining trade costs due to maritime and overland transport revolutions, the 
liberalization of commercial policy, and the development of transaction technologies, in 
particular the classical gold standard (Jacks, Meissner, and Novy, 2011). Underlying 
these developments was the trade-stimulating effect of Pax Britannica. All of this, of 
course, came to a screeching halt in 1914 as illustrated in Figure 1. 
Thus, in the first two years of the conflict, the world economy suffered its first 
great trade collapse with exports—which had been growing 4.2% annually from 1901 to 
1913—declining by 24.6% in real terms. And following a pronounced spike in 1916, a 
slow and steady decline set in with world exports in 1920 being roughly at the same level 
as in 1906. However, even this short-lived recovery in trade volumes was more apparent 
than real as the composition of traded goods shifted from items intended for peacetime 
consumption and production towards goods intended to wage total war (Findlay and 
O’Rourke, 2008). It also reflected a massive change in the direction of bilateral trade 
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flows. For instance, real exports from Canada and the United States to the United 
Kingdom—already among the world’s largest trade flows in 1913—increased from 11.4 
billion 1990 USD in that year to 26.4 billion in 1918 and remained at elevated levels 
until 1920. Conversely, real exports from Canada and the United States to Germany—
also already among the world’s largest trade flows in 1913—collapsed from 4.6 billion 
1990 USD in 1913 to zero in 1918. 
 
 
Figure 1: World Exports, 1901-1920 
Note: Figures expressed in billions of 1990 USD 
Source: Derived from Jacks and Tang (2018) 
 
More importantly, World War I gave rise to a distressing erosion in the European 
share of world exports (Jacks and Tang, 2018). This can clearly be seen in Figure 2. In 
1910, Europe commanded a 60.0% share of world exports trailed by North America at 
15.0% and Asia at 10.8%. In 1920, the respective values were 39.4%, 33.8%, and 13.7% 
(with the combined share of Africa, Oceania, and South America virtually unchanged). 
Along with the physical destruction of productive capacity and transport infrastructure, 
much of this process represented a new incursion of American and Japanese firms in 
Latin American and East and Southeast Asian markets, areas which had previously been 
contested by their European counterparts.  
This not only signaled the rising stature of Japan and the US as the preeminent 
industrial powers of Asia and the Atlantic economy but also placed considerable 
constraints on European nations after the war. The erosion in European market share in 
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combination with relatively anemic levels of worldwide trade hampered repayment of 
the large amount of debt accrued by European nations during the prosecution of the 
war. Thus, total European exports fell from 155.6 billion 1990 USD in 1913 to 81.7 billion 
in 1920. This was particularly a problem for Germany which was saddled with 
reparations and which saw its 21.0% share of European exports in 1913 whittled down to 
7.1% in 1920. 
 
 
Figure 2: Shares of World Exports, 1901-1920 
Note: Figures depict regional shares of world exports 
Source: Derived from Jacks and Tang (2018) 
 
Naturally, one of the fundamental forces driving this dislocation in trade levels 
and patterns was a drastic change in commercial policy. Formerly, tariffs were the 
primary form of commercial policy, and relatively mild protectionism and revenue 
collection were its primary goals. The war gave rise to multiple additional sources of 
trade frictions, primarily in the form of exchange controls, licensing systems, and 
quantitative restrictions. All of these were geared towards preserving foreign exchange 
reserves at home and punishing enemies abroad by cutting off sources of both essential 
war materiel and export earnings (Gordon, 1941). 
 
2.2. Post-war recovery, the second great trade collapse, and trade blocs 
versus trade wars in the 1930s   
One of the most striking changes arising from World War I can be seen in the 
simple chronology of European maps. From the wreckage of the Austro-Hungarian and 
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Russian Empires, fully eleven new nation-states arose. Thus, East-Central Europe went 
from having three principal borders (Austria-Hungary/Germany, Austria-
Hungary/Russia, and Germany/Russia) to thirteen new international borders. This 
presumably had detrimental effects on trade within the region as the academic literature 
has empirically associated borders with diminished trade flows, even for countries 
which are economically similar, geographically proximate, and highly integrated 
(McCallum, 1995).  
Further afield, World War I played a decisive role in not only the creation of new 
nation-states, but also new nation-states with a decidedly different orientation towards 
the world economy. The dissolution of the Russian Empire generated an immediate 
99.8% drop in exports from 1913 to 1923, while the rise of the Soviet Union provided a 
model of autarkic economic development which became distinctly more appealing in the 
coming decades. What is more, following World War I many of the previously prevailing 
trends in trade costs confronted countervailing forces in the form of cartelization in the 
transport sector, the resurrection of a hobbled gold standard, and a lingering sense of 
discord and distrust in international relations.  
But for all this, the prospect of returning to pre-war levels of integration—and 
perhaps even pre-war levels of international cooperation—seemed surprisingly bright by 
the late 1920s. Figure 3 suggests one potential source of such optimism: after suffering 
through the sharp but short-lived worldwide deflationary episode of 1920-1921, world 
exports grew by 82.5% in the eight years from 1921 to 1929. This was not only the fastest 
rate of export growth since 1870 (indeed, in the entire century from 1870 to 1970): 1929 
also marked the highest level of world exports ever recorded. Additionally, the 
distribution of world exports as depicted in Figure 4 was quickly converging to its 
apparent pre-war equilibrium: in 1929, European exports were 53.9% of the world total 
(as compared to their 57.7% share in 1913), while the combined Asian and North 
American export share had quickly receded to 32.9% (as compared to their 28.3% share 
in 1913 and their 53.0% share in 1918). Thus, the global economy of the day seemed well 
on its way to a successful recovery from the trauma induced by World War I. 
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Figure 3: World Exports, 1920-1939 
Note: Figures expressed in billions of 1990 USD 
Source: Derived from Jacks and Tang (2018) 
 
 
Figure 4: Shares of World Exports, 1920-1939 
Note: Figures depict regional shares of world exports 
Source: Derived from Jacks and Tang (2018) 
 
All such expectations faded shortly after 1929 when two large shocks emerged in 
the world economy. The simultaneous decline in global economic activity and the 
drafting of the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill from the summer of 1929 constituted serious 
threats to the two drivers of the 1920s trade boom: buoyant incomes and relatively open 
commercial policy. There is a voluminous literature on understanding the Great 
Depression’s origins and propagation which we cannot hope to summarize here. 
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However, there is close to a professional consensus that the origins of the Great 
Depression emerged in the US in the form of restrictive monetary policy in 1928-1929 
along with a rash of bank failures in 1931 (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). And there is 
also close to a professional consensus that its international propagation came from the 
lethal interaction of the prevailing orthodoxy in economic thought (Eichengreen and 
Temin, 2000) and the resurrected gold standard (Eichengreen, 1992). In any case, the 
results were clear with world GDP declining by 10.1% from 1929 to 1932. 
With respect to commercial policy, any remaining glimmer of hope steadily 
diminished throughout the remainder of 1929 and the beginning of 1930 as the session 
and accompanying log-rolling process surrounding Smoot-Hawley was taken to 
unprecedented lengths (Taussig, 1930). As Kindleberger (1989, p. 170) writes, 
“Democrats joined Republicans in their support for tariffs for all who sought them; and 
both Republicans and Democrats were ultimately pushed from the committee room as 
lobbyists took over the task of setting the rates.” The aim of the legislation was 
remarkably clear in its focus as well as remarkably myopic to its likely consequences: in 
response to not-so-veiled threats of foreign retaliation, the House Ways and Means 
Committee replied that “‘they were not so concerned with American exports, but only 
with the prevention of imports’” (quoted in Kottman, 1975, pp. 615-616).  
For some countries, the response to Smoot-Hawley was nearly immediate and, in 
at least one instance, more than just immediate: in anticipation of the bill’s final passage 
in June 1930, Canada announced changes to its tariff schedule a full month beforehand 
(Jacks, 2014). However, while the trade wars of the 1930s have often been characterized 
as direct retaliation in response to Smoot-Hawley (e.g., Jones, 1934), the reality is that 
relatively few countries engaged in explicit tit-for-tat behavior in setting their 
commercial policy in the period from 1930 (Irwin, 2011). Smoot-Hawley was simply 
then a shot across the bow to the world economy, signaling a precarious commitment to 
open markets on the part of the leading power of the day. 
Another blow in this regard came in 1931, a year which is a relatively 
underappreciated watershed for the global economy as it witnessed the British 
abandonment of both the gold standard and its long-standing adherence to free trade 
(Capie, 1983; Rooth, 2010). But why was this significant? In the first instance, it 
presented other countries with an alternative, reflationary response to the Great 
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Depression. That is, abandonment of the gold standard put the possibility of external 
devaluation as opposed to internal deflation on the table (Temin, 1993). In the second 
instance, it signaled a British willingness to sacrifice the reemergent multilateral trading 
system in order to further champion a bloc-based trading system with the 
Commonwealth at its heart (de Bromhead et al., 2019a). 
As seen in Figure 3, a second great trade collapse set in from 1929 to 1932 with 
real exports down by 49.1%. When matched against the cumulative decline in world 
GDP (-10.1%) over the same period, this decline in world exports was remarkably 
severe. Conclusively locating the sources of this trade collapse has remained elusive (cf. 
Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor, 2003; Madsen, 2001). But clearly, it suggests a 
strong role for both changes in the composition of trade (de Bromhead et al., 2019b) 
and rising trade costs (Jacks, Meissner, and Novy, 2011; Hynes, Jacks, and O’Rourke, 
2011), particularly in the form of heightened protectionism. 
From 1931, much of this protectionism was built on the foundation laid during 
World War I, and it again gave rise to the substitution of exchange controls, licensing 
systems, and quantitative restrictions for tariffs as the primary levers of commercial 
policy. Thus, Gordon (1941) estimates that by 1939 roughly one-half of world trade was 
either subject only to tariffs or even tariff-free, while the other half was much more 
tightly circumscribed by non-tariff barriers to trade. But the overwhelming aim of both 
tariff and non-tariff barriers was as a defense to the deflationary forces embedded in the 
global economy, particularly for those countries which remained wedded to the gold 
standard (Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010). Thus, protectionism was exercised primarily 
against all trade partners and in a distinctly uncoordinated fashion with instances of 
bilateral retaliation being minor and rare in comparison (Gordon, 1941; Heuser, 1939). 
Instead, bilateralism was most prevalent in the series of concessions and treaties 
which were signed throughout the 1930s. In this regard, reference is generally made to 
the US Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 as setting the stage (e.g., Berglund, 
1935). However, an earlier example is perhaps even more telling. The Imperial 
Economic (or Ottawa) Conference of 1932 had as its purpose the promotion of intra-
imperial trade, primarily through preferential concessions to members rather than 
common protectionist policy against others (Jacks, 2014). Thus, the UK managed to 
negotiate seven agreements on a strictly bilateral basis with Australia, Canada, India, 
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Newfoundland, New Zealand, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia as well as grant 
substantial tariff concessions to a number of non-self-governing colonies (Lattimer, 
1934). Likewise, Canada managed to negotiate or re-negotiate five bilateral agreements 
with Australia, the Irish Free State, New Zealand, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia, 
while further agreements with India and Newfoundland were concluded very shortly 
thereafter (Hart, 2002). 
 Many if not most of the bilateral concessions reached in the 1930s were 
specifically geared towards easing balance of payment issues (Gordon, 1941) and 
therefore may have had the effect of reducing bilateral current account 
deficits/surpluses (see section 3.3 below). Indeed, at least 59 treaties signed between 
1931 and 1939 contained explicit bilateral trade-balancing measures (Snyder, 1940). 
Presumably, the fear of depleting foreign exchange reserves also explains the extremely 
short duration of many of these treaties—oftentimes, one year or less—with escape 
clauses requiring a mere few weeks’ notice being given (Snyder, 1940). What is more, 
one of the underlying goals of a number of these treaties was the strengthening of 
existing or new trade blocs, primarily centered on Germany and the UK and at least 
partially geared towards securing food and raw materials on the basis of national 
security concerns (Kindleberger, 1989).  
The theme of trade blocs has dominated the academic literature on interwar 
trade, and we return to it in the following section. But for all this, world exports did 
manage to somewhat recover from their nadir in 1932. As shown in Figure 3, world 
exports were up 82.0% by 1937, substantially outstripping the increase in global GDP at 
20.7%. Admittedly, conditions deteriorated in 1938 when the prospect of another war 
loomed very large. But the characterization of the entirety of the 1930s as a time of 
retaliatory and targeted trade wars with deleterious effects on trade flows seems 
somewhat off the mark.  
 
3. Gravity in the interwar period 
In this section, we consider the well-established gravity model of international 
trade to analyze the shift of trade patterns associated with trade blocs and trade wars 
during the interwar period. We also provide a variance decomposition to pin down the 
influence of geography and trade blocs over the long run. 
 
 
12 
 
3.1 Basic framework and previous literature  
In the past 20 years, the gravity model has emerged as the uncontestable 
workhorse of empirical international trade. By now, a very large literature documents its 
applicability both over particular episodes in the history of globalization and in the long 
run (Jacks, Meissner, and Novy, 2011). Moreover, it has been shown that gravity 
equations can be derived from a wide range of leading trade models. Although the 
driving forces behind international trade differ across these models, they all predict a 
gravity equation for international expenditure patterns. Grossman (1998, pp. 29-30) 
nicely summarizes this situation: “specialization lies behind the explanatory power [of 
gravity], and of course some degree of specialization is at the heart of any model of 
trade…this is true no matter what supply-side considerations give rise to specialization, 
be they increasing returns to scale in a world of differentiated products, technology 
differences in a world of Ricardian trade, or large factor endowment differences in a 
world of Heckscher-Ohlin trade.”   
An estimating equation for gravity models of trade which is consistent with the 
best practice established by the literature (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) takes the 
form of:  
(1)  ln(𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗𝑡 + 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡, 
where xijt represents real bilateral exports from country i to j at time t; the αit and αjt 
terms represent exporter and importer fixed effects intended to capture multilateral 
trade barriers, productivity, resource endowments, and any other time-varying country-
level attributes which might determine a country’s propensity to trade; zijt is a set of 
variables representing various bilateral variables that impede or promote the flow of 
goods between countries i and j. It includes familiar standards in the literature such as 
the physical bilateral distance separating countries and indicators for trade blocs. The 
εijt variable is an error term. 
 In the context of the interwar period, there exists a healthy literature on using 
variants of equation (1) to explore the role of newly formed trade and currency blocs in 
reorienting world trade, particularly after the Great Depression and the subsequent 
collapse of both the resurrected gold standard and the vestigial multilateral trading 
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system of the pre-war period. The first entrant to this literature was the work of 
Eichengreen and Irwin (1995). They consider bilateral trade flows taken separately for 
the years 1928, 1935, and 1938. Their primary concern is to quantify the independent 
effects on trade of the formation of trade blocs (in particular, the British Commonwealth 
and the so-called Reichsmark bloc1) and of the formation of currency blocs (in 
particular, the sterling area comprised of countries with currencies explicitly tied to the 
pound sterling and a gold bloc comprised of European countries which remained on the 
gold standard after Britain’s departure in 1931).  
Using a (now non-standard) gravity framework, their main result is that there is a 
positive association between trade and bloc membership within the British 
Commonwealth and within the Reichsmark bloc. This positive link was apparent as 
early as 1928, suggesting that the blocs were endogenous to preexisting trade flows 
among their members. However, there seem to be no discernible effects of the separate 
currency blocs. Ritschl and Wolf (2011) revisit these results in an attempt to recover the 
true causal effects of the currency blocs. Likewise, Gowa and Hicks (2013) use a more 
extensive data set confirming Eichengreen and Irwin’s original results. Additionally, 
they argue that the intent of the blocs was not in terms of enhanced trade flows in 
general, but in tying satellite countries more closely to Britain and Germany in 
anticipation of another great war. In what follows, we revisit this literature and shed 
new light on certain aspects of the 1930s experience with trade blocs, trade flows, and 
trade wars. Our approach is in part to consider a new panel data set on bilateral trade 
flows and in part to estimate a gravity model representing the state-of-the-art as in 
specification (1) with a particular emphasis on the time-varying effects of bloc 
membership and distance. 
 
3.2 Bilateral trade data and the definition of blocs  
We use a data set of annual bilateral trade flows from 1920 to 1939, deflated by 
USCPI in 1990, taken from Jacks and Novy (2018), and covering 53 countries (in 
                                                 
1 Although named for a currency, the Reichsmark bloc constituted a set of “bilateral trading agreements 
[between Germany and] central and south-eastern European countries and the creation of a central 
clearing system in Berlin” (Milward, 1985, p. 31). Furthermore, in order to conserve German gold 
reserves, settlement of the related trade balances only occurred in Reichsmarks, hence the name.  
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comparison, Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) consider bilateral trade for 34 countries). 
Figure 5 summarizes the sample graphically.2 On average, this sample constitutes 82% 
of world GDP over this period. Thus, we have a balanced sample of 611 country pairs 
over the 20 years from 1920 to 1939, yielding 12,220 observations in total of which 114 
are recorded as zeroes.3 
 
 
Figure 5: Sample Countries 
Note: 53 sample countries depicted in black 
 
We code indicator variables for the various blocs discussed by Eichengreen and 
Irwin (1995). We consider two trade blocs (the Commonwealth and the Reichsmark 
bloc) and two currency blocs (the gold bloc and the sterling area). For countries which 
were not in Eichengreen and Irwin’s original sample, we use information on bloc 
membership provided by Gowa and Hicks (2013, Table A2). Importantly, these bloc 
indicators do not vary over time. In the main, they capture trade flows within blocs 
(when both the exporter and the importer are bloc members). 
                                                 
2 The countries in our sample are Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgian Congo, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, the Dutch East Indies, 
Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, 
Romania, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Spain, the Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zambia. 
3 If we had all possible bilateral pairs over these 20 years, our sample would consist of 55,120 observations 
(equal to 53 countries * 52 partners * 20 years). In comparison, Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) cover 561 
bilateral pairs for the years 1928, 1935, and 1938 (1683 observations in total). Critically, their data does 
not cover the trade collapse of the early 1930s. 
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Following Eichengreen and Irwin (1995, p. 15), the Commonwealth consists of 
seven core countries: Australia, Canada, India, the Irish Free State, New Zealand, South 
Africa, and the United Kingdom. We adopt this definition but note that the Irish Free 
State is not in our sample. To this, we add the following nine countries: Egypt, Ghana, 
Guyana, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Zambia. We create two 
indicators: a baseline indicator comprising all 15 countries and a narrow indicator 
comprising only the first seven countries, all of which were signatories at the Imperial 
Economic Conference. The other countries were non-self-governing territories for which 
there were some concessions at the Conference, but it is not clear how large these 
concessions were. Eichengreen and Irwin (1995, p. 16) define the Reichsmark bloc as 
comprising eight countries: Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, and Romania. We adopt this definition but Austria, Czechoslovakia, and 
Hungary are not in our sample.  
In terms of gold bloc countries, Eichengreen and Irwin (1995, p. 17) list Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands, Poland, and Switzerland. We adopt this definition but note 
that Poland is not in our sample. We also add Italy following Gowa and Hicks (2013). As 
to the sterling area, Eichengreen and Irwin (1995, p. 17) list the member countries as 
Australia, Denmark, Finland, India, the Irish Free State, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, South Africa, and Sweden. We adopt this definition with the Irish Free State 
again missing. We also add Argentina, Bolivia, Egypt, and Thailand. These 13 countries 
(plus the UK) form the core members of the sterling area. In addition, we include the 
following seven countries that had reasonably stable exchange rates with respect to 
sterling: Ghana, Guyana, Malaysia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Zambia.4 Our 
                                                 
4 Our motivation for adding these seven countries comes from a close consideration of their nominal 
exchange rates over the sample period. For Ghana, the cedi trades 2 to 1 against sterling throughout the 
sample period (the maximum deviation is +/-10%). The Guyanese dollar is initially pegged to sterling at a 
rate of 5 to 1. After the British abandonment of the gold standard, there is more variability in the exchange 
rate but still in the bounds of +/-10%. For Malaysia, the ringgit trades 8.6 to 1 against sterling throughout 
the 1930s with a maximum deviation of +/-10%. For Nigeria, the naira trades 2 to 1 against sterling 
throughout the 1930s with a maximum deviation of +/-10%. For Sri Lanka, the rupee trades around 14 to 
1 against sterling although there is significant variability in the exchange rate in the early 1920s and the 
Great Depression. For Sudan, the Sudanese pound trades at 1 to 1 against sterling with some exchange 
rate variability in the early 1920s and the Great Depression. For Zambia, the kwacha/pound trades at 1 to 
1 against sterling with some variability in the early 1920s and the Great Depression. Note that we do not 
include Hong Kong in this group of countries. The Hong Kong dollar moves from 3.5 units per sterling in 
1920 to 16 units in 1939. Visual inspection of the series suggests that there is too much variability 
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baseline sterling area indicator thus captures 21 countries.5 We also construct a narrow 
indicator that only comprises the 14 core members. 
To summarize, within-Commonwealth trade flows represent 8.8% of the 
observations in the sample (3.6% based on our narrow definition), and Commonwealth 
trade flows with outside partners represent 34% of observations. The within-
Reichsmark bloc only represents a tiny share of our sample—0.3% of observations—and 
this bloc’s trade with outside partners represents 17.8% of observations. For trade 
within the gold bloc, the fraction of observations is 2.6%, and the corresponding figure 
for trade between the gold bloc and outside members is 25.5%. Finally, trade flows 
within the sterling area represent 12.9% (8.8% based on our narrow definition) and 43% 
with outside members. 
  
3.3 Contours of bilateral trade in the wake of the second great trade 
collapse 
 As a preliminary exercise, we explore a few interesting contours of the data, 
particularly as they relate to the second great trade collapse starting from 1929 and the 
trade wars of the 1930s. First, as already documented in Figure 3, real exports fell by 
49.1% from 1929 to 1932. However, it remains an open question as to whether this 
decline was evenly distributed across country pairs. Figure 6 accordingly plots the 
distribution of the percentage declines in the real value of trade between 1929 and 1932 
for all bilateral pairs at our disposal. The average change was -43% with a very wide 
range of -97% to +374%. However, fully 93% of bilateral pairs suffered a decline in their 
trade with one another into 1932. Also, as depicted in Figure 3, a recovery was underway 
from 1932 as seen in the flattening of the distribution for the cumulative decline 
between 1929 and 1935 and between 1929 and 1938 where the average changes climbed 
to -3.2% and +9.7%, respectively. Interestingly though, this recovery was asymmetric as 
63% of bilateral pairs were still registering declines in their trade with one another into 
                                                 
(particularly in the mid-1930s possibly related to the strained operation of China’s silver standard) for the 
Hong Kong dollar-sterling relationship to be classified as a credible peg. 
5 As many countries in the Commonwealth bloc and the sterling area overlap, the correlation between the 
two indicators is 0.52. The correlations between the other bloc indicators are close to zero. 
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1938, suggesting significant changes potentially along the lines of trade and currency 
blocs.  
 
 
Figure 6: Changes in the Value of Bilateral Trade, 1929-1938 
Note: Histogram of percentage changes in trade across country pairs  
 
 Another aspect which we can draw out from the bilateral trade data is the degree 
to which commercial policy after 1929 was geared towards reducing bilateral trade 
balance deficits and surpluses. Again, this is a claim often asserted in the contemporary 
literature (Gordon, 1941; Snyder, 1940), but it has never been documented to the best of 
our knowledge. Figure 7 depicts the distribution of the (absolute) value of bilateral trade 
balances for the years 1929, 1932, 1935, and 1938, measured in billions of 1990 USD. It 
clearly shows a strong progression towards more balanced trade between 1929 (with a 
mean imbalance of  = 0.19) and 1932 ( = 0.10), a slight easing between 1932 and 1935 
( = 0.12), and a near return to pre-collapse values between 1935 and 1938 ( = 0.15).6 
Thus, to the extent that balance of payments pressures were addressed by reducing 
bilateral trade deficits, much of this impetus had presumably faded by 1938 when other 
considerations had come to the fore.  
A final aspect worth emphasizing here relates to the relatively unappreciated fact 
that the second great trade collapse disproportionately affected long-distance country 
pairs. As Figure 8 shows, the average trade-weighted distance over the entire period is 
                                                 
6 Alternatively, the transition can be seen if we consider the respective ranges rather than averages for 
1929 (0.00, 4.75), 1932 (0.00, 2.08), 1935 (0.00, 2.60), and 1939 (0.00, 4.22). 
-100% -75% -50% -25% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
1929-1932
1929-1935
1929-1938
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5,675 km. However, while the average trade-weighted distance remains relatively stable 
until 1929, there is a substantial and sudden drop to 5,108 km in 1931. This measure 
then starts to rise, reaching a peak of 6,013 km in 1937. 
 
 
Figure 7: Bilateral Trade Balances (absolute values), 1929-1938 
Note: Histogram of trade balances across country pairs in billions of 1990 USD 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Trade-Weighted Distances, 1920-1939 
Note: Weighted average of bilateral distances in km across country pairs 
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These patterns of stability, sharp decline, and substantial recovery can be roughly 
discerned across all countries and within and outside all trade and currency blocs with 
two notable exceptions. First, within the Commonwealth the average trade-weighted 
distance exhibits an upward secular trend throughout the 1920s and 1930s. What is 
more, there was no decline in this measure—indeed, there was an increase—during the 
second great trade collapse, suggesting that trade between Commonwealth countries 
was disrupted proportionally less.7 Second, within the sterling area the average trade-
weighted distance exhibits a slight but steady decline throughout the 1920s and 1930s. 
Finally, all these aspects suggest that in some measure, the effects of the trade 
wars of the early 1930s were of relatively short duration. Bilateral trade volumes and 
bilateral trade balances were rising on average from their lows in the early 1930s while 
trade-weighted distances had recovered by 1935. However, the possibility remains that 
the trade wars of the early 1930s mainly served to intensify pre-existing efforts towards 
the formation of trade blocs which dated from—and presumably, even before—1920. 
 
3.4 Gravity regressions 
 We run panel gravity regressions based on our annual bilateral trade flows over 
the period from 1920 to 1939. All regressions include time-varying exporter and 
importer fixed effects using OLS. We are particularly interested in the behavior of the 
distance elasticity and indicator variables for the four blocs under consideration.8 A 
standard gravity regression with logarithmic distance as the only regressor of interest 
yields a distance elasticity of -0.69 with a standard error of 0.02. The R-squared stands 
at 72%. This basic finding confirms the well-known result that gravity is indeed 
applicable for the pre-1950 world (see Jacks, Meissner, and Novy, 2011). 
In the next step, we add indicator variables for the four blocs and allow them to 
vary over time. These regressions are similar in spirit to those reported by Eichengreen 
and Irwin (1995, Table 2) and Gowa and Hicks (2013, Table 3). The main difference is 
that we use data for every consecutive year over this period. This allows us to see time 
                                                 
7 The same observation holds for our narrow Commonwealth dummy that captures fewer countries. 
8 For the results reported here, we do not include an indicator for a common border between two 
countries as it does not display any systematic pattern over time, and it is often insignificant. 
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trends more clearly.9 We present the results in Figure 9 where we depict the value of the 
coefficients in every year for our four blocs: within the Commonwealth, within the 
Reichsmark bloc, within the gold bloc, and within the sterling area. To achieve 
comparability, we normalize these coefficients to 100 for the year 1920. The gold bloc 
and sterling area coefficients exhibit no particular trend over time. The Reichsmark bloc 
coefficient initially falls but then strongly rises after 1932. However, the most striking 
observation is the rise of within-Commonwealth trade. The Commonwealth coefficient 
more than doubles throughout the interwar period, reaching a value of 269 in 1939. It 
shows a particularly strong upward trend after 1931, suggesting an intensification of 
trade within the Commonwealth due to the imposition of discriminatory trade policies 
by Britain (de Bromhead et al., 2019a).10 
 
 
Figure 9: Bilateral Trade within Blocs, 1920-1939 
Note: Coefficients for bloc membership by year, normalized to 1920 = 100 
 
                                                 
9 Since we use exporter and importer fixed effects, we cannot simultaneously include both intra-bloc and 
extra-bloc indicators due to collinearity. This is in direct contrast with Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) who 
do not employ importer and importer fixed effects and thus do not control for multilateral resistance 
effects. Note that since the bloc indicators do not vary over time, we do not add pair fixed effects. 
10 Formally, we cannot reject the joint equality of the Commonwealth coefficients (p-value = 0.29) since 
confidence intervals are quite large. Results are very similar when we use the narrow definitions of the 
Commonwealth and the sterling area. 
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In Figure 10, we plot distance elasticities for each bloc that are allowed to vary 
over time. That is, we allow for a triple interaction of distance by time by bloc.11 Again, 
we normalize these coefficients to 100 for the year 1920. This converts negative 
coefficients on distance into positive shares of the original effect. Thus, the distance 
elasticity for the Commonwealth stands at -1.19 in 1920 (index value = 100.0) and -0.31 
in 1929 (index value = 26.2). What is most remarkable from this figure is the fact that 
the distance elasticity for the Commonwealth: (1) is consistently falling throughout the 
1920s and 1930s12 and (2) attains a value of zero in 1939.13  
 
 
Figure 10: Bilateral Distance Elasticities within Blocs, 1920-1939 
Note: Value of regression coefficient for distance by year, normalized to 1920 = 100 
 
 Naturally, this result is linked to the steady rise in the average trade-weighted 
distance of bilateral trade within the Commonwealth documented in section 3.3: the 
longer the distance covered by the average trade flow, the less sensitive trade appears to 
be to distance in the context of regression analysis. Figure 10 also reveals roughly 
constant distance elasticities for the gold and Reichsmark blocs, while there appears to 
                                                 
11 We also estimate distance elasticities for the omitted group of pairs that are captured by neither the 
Commonwealth, the Reichsmark bloc, the gold bloc, nor the sterling area. This group of “other” pairs has 
a distance elasticity of around -0.30 and is fairly stable over time. 
12 Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) stress a similar result for the singular year of 1928, citing early evidence 
by Schlote (1952) and Thorbecke (1960) who “are skeptical that imperial preference was primarily 
responsible for the growth of intra-Commonwealth trade [as] the trend was evident earlier…” 
13 At the same time, we cannot reject the joint equality of the annual Commonwealth distance elasticities 
(p = 0.24). 
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be a modest—albeit insignificant—increase in the trade-diminishing effects of distance 
for the sterling area. 
In summary, we conclude that interwar trade patterns can be roughly 
characterized by two dominant observations. First, there was a persistent long-run trend 
towards the “death of distance” in the context of bilateral trade flows within the 
Commonwealth, but decidedly nowhere else. Second, there were also substantial 
increases in bilateral trade flows associated with both the Commonwealth and the 
Reichsmark bloc from 1931 and 1932, respectively. However, in the case of the 
Commonwealth, the second great trade collapse and its related trade wars seemed to 
only reinforce a pre-existing trend built around a surging trade bloc, spanning nearly all 
continents of the globe.14 
 
3.5 Variance decomposition 
As an alternative to regression coefficients, we now consider variance 
decompositions. As before, we focus on distance elasticities and indicator variables for 
the four blocs. While we have shown above that both show systematic patterns in 
regressions, so far we have not ascertained their relative importance in explaining trade 
patterns. A decomposition of the variance of trade flows is well-suited for that purpose. 
We follow the variance decomposition approach suggested by Fields (2003). 
Although his focus is on income inequality in the labor market, the methodology can be 
applied more generally to linear specifications such as the gravity equation in 
logarithmic form. The objective is to explain the variance of the dependent variable 
which for us is the logarithm of bilateral trade flows. The approach used by Fields 
(2003) determines the share of the variance of the dependent variable which can be 
attributed to each individual regressor on the right-hand side. Specifically, the variance 
share attributed to an individual regressor is given as 
  (2) 𝑠𝑚 = 𝛽𝑚
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑧𝑚,ln 𝑥)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(ln𝑥)
, 
                                                 
14 Kindleberger (1989, p. 161) explains that the British orientation towards the Commonwealth/Empire to 
some extent had its origins in World War I. Referring to the duties imposed by the UK in the 1915 
McKenna budget, he writes: “The tariffs, moreover, made it possible for the United Kingdom to 
discriminate in trade in favour of the British Empire, something it could not do under the regime of free 
trade which had prevailed since the 1850s.” 
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where m is the regression coefficient of the dependent variable ln x (logarithmic 
bilateral trade) on the explanatory variable zm (logarithmic distance or a bloc indicator), 
holding all other explanatory variables constant. Cov and Var denote the covariance and 
variance, respectively. 
We apply this methodology to the annual gravity regressions with exporter and 
importer fixed effects, revealing that bilateral distance is the most important 
determinant for explaining the variance of bilateral trade with a contribution of 7.4% on 
average.15 But as the top line in Figure 11 illustrates, the contribution of distance 
declines from almost 9% in the early 1920s to just over 6% by the late 1930s. Again, this 
trend predates the second great trade collapse, suggesting that distance becomes less 
influential as a determinant of trade flows over the 1920s and 1930s. 
 
 
Figure 11: Variance Decomposition for Bilateral Trade Flows, 1920-1939 
Note: Share of variation in bilateral trade explained by independent variables 
 
Turning to the indicator variables for the four blocs, we find that they are not 
nearly as important in explaining the variance of bilateral trade since individual bloc 
contributions never exceed 2%. In terms of the individual bloc contributions, the 
Commonwealth dummy explains around 1% of the variance on average. However, this 
contribution increases over time especially after 1931. This finding is consistent with our 
                                                 
15 This contribution of distance is in line with results for geographic indicators and transport cost variables 
in a study by Chen and Novy (2011) who explain the variance of trade costs. It is also roughly in the same 
ballpark as contributions of key regressors such as experience and schooling in the Mincer regressions 
decomposed by Fields (2003). 
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earlier regression results. The contributions of the gold and Reichsmark blocs are 
negligible.16 The contribution of the sterling area averages a relatively healthy 1.1% but 
with a slight decline over time. In general, this result means that geography in the form 
of bilateral distance is clearly the dominant determinant of bilateral trade, while 
political institutions in the form of trade and currency blocs are of second order. We 
were not able to obtain this insight from standard gravity coefficients alone.  
What explains the remaining variance? Most of the variance is explained by the 
residuals (88% on average). This is hardly surprising since the residuals absorb all the 
variance in the data that cannot be explained by the gravity model. This finding is 
typical (for instance, see Table 3 in Fields, 2003). Although exporter and importer fixed 
effects are important theoretically as they represent income and multilateral resistance 
variables, they are not pair-specific and therefore not crucial for explaining bilateral 
flows. In our sample, exporter and importer fixed effects combined explain 3.2% of the 
variance on average. This share has no trend over time, but it does dip below 2% in 
1932-1933, suggesting that country-specific factors were less important during the 
depths of the second great trade collapse.  
 
4. The lessons and limits of historical parallels 
To summarize, we have argued that the trade wars of the early 1930s were 
executed primarily against all trade partners and in a distinctly uncoordinated fashion 
with instances of bilateral retaliation being minor and rare in comparison. Instead, the 
overwhelming aim of both tariff and non-tariff barriers was as a defense to the 
deflationary forces embedded in the global economy at the time. Moreover, using an 
extensive panel of annual bilateral trade data for the entirety of the interwar period, we 
have found that the effects of the trade wars of the early 1930s were of relatively short 
duration and that they mainly served to intensify pre-existing efforts towards the 
formation of trade blocs, above all the British Commonwealth. 
                                                 
16 The respective contributions are 0.1% and -0.6% on average. The negative sign of the gold bloc 
contribution is due to the negative coefficient on the gold bloc indicator in the underlying regressions. 
That is, relative to the omitted group (all country pairs that do not belong to other blocs), gold bloc pairs 
trade less on average after we control for bilateral distance and exporter and importer fixed effects. 
Formally, a negative contribution in the decomposition is only possible if the regression coefficient carries 
the opposite sign of the covariance between the regressor and the dependent variable. 
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By way of conclusion, we offer up some observations, highlighting the lessons and 
limits of historical parallels as they relate to the notion of trade wars. First, the present 
day does seem to share some common features with the 1930s. In particular, there is the 
prospect that a formerly dominant multilateral trading system is in danger of being 
replaced by a set of bilateral “deals”. Thus, the 1930s witnessed the unraveling of an 
informal, but long-standing agreement among most nations of the world in which 
commercial relations were guided by the distinctly multilateral principles laid out in the 
Cobden-Chevalier treaty of 1860. But during the better part of 20 years it took to 
rediscover and institutionalize these features in the form of the GATT, many of these 
same nations first scrambled to erect protectionist walls against all comers and then to 
punch holes through them via bilaterally-negotiated systems of preferences.  
 At the moment, we have not witnessed a wholesale collapse of the modern 
trading system. This is partially for the fact that policymakers seem to have learned 
some of the lessons of interwar history by not responding in a general fashion to 
unilateral moves toward protectionism. This does, however, raise the prospect that the 
trade wars of the present day may serve the same purpose of those in the 1930s, that is, 
the intensification of existing and nascent trade blocs. Thus, it requires no great 
imagination to see a future in which consumers’ preferences, firms’ perceptions of 
uncertainty, and states’ apprehensions of one another endogenously lead to a 
reorientation of world trade around China- and US-centric trade blocs.  
Of course, one particularly telling difference of the present day from the interwar 
period comes from the composition of trade. Even a brief review of the historical 
literature on interwar trade reveals that this was still a world dominated by inter-
industry trade with only 43% of world exports being classified as manufactured goods 
(Jacks and Tang, 2018). In contrast, manufactured goods now constitute the 
overwhelming majority of world exports, and the subsequent fragmentation of 
production has given rise to both a heightened sensitivity of trade flows to protectionist 
measures and a heightened sense of mutual interdependence across countries (Baldwin, 
2016; Feenstra, 1998). Thus, the extent to which global value chains can be unraveled 
arguably places limits on how far this prospective bloc-based trajectory for world trade 
might proceed. 
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